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4 Modernism and history 
Abstract: This chapter critiques Adorno and Taruskin as exemplars of ‘capital H’ and ‘small h’ 
approaches to music history. Highlighting the anomalous prominence granted to Adorno even as 
his arch-modernist ideals seemed most at odds with nascent ‘postmodernism’, I note a similar 
historiographical tension in Taruskin’s Oxford History of Western Music. Challenging Taruskin’s 
ostensibly anti-Hegelian ‘superperiodization’ and ‘quasi-dialectical’ constructs, I let Boulez 
inspire fresh reading of Baudelaire’s oft-misunderstood framing of modernity. 
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Modernism and history 
David J. Code 
‘I personally recall that world, which you can only imagine was preferable to this 
one,’ she said. ‘Eras are conveniences, particularly for those who never 
experienced them. We carve history from totalities beyond our grasp. Bolt labels 
on the result.’ 
 – William Gibson, The Peripheral (2014)1 
Thus it is the evolution – the fate – of our own thinking that we have seen, for 
good or ill, inscribing itself into those studies that were intended, above all, to 
scrutinize a recent past. 
 – Pierre Boulez, Penser la musique aujourd’hui (1963)2 
Any inquiry into ‘modernism and history’ that begins with the hope of securely framing 
modernism in history will quickly discover the acuity of the image, in my first epigraph, of 
contingent constructs carved from an ungraspable totality. For even if we sidestep the thorny 
question of modernism’s elusive historical origins – to which we find numerous, widely 
disparate answers across specialist and non-specialist literatures alike – what might seem at first 
like a more secure ending boundary for a distinctly modernist historiography also proves, on 
closer inquiry, a ‘convenience’ of differing value for different commentators. Within an 
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accessible 1997 evaluation of the discipline of history around the millennium, for example, 
Richard J. Evans, while accepting that some of the publications he describes as postmodern 
‘would probably not be accepted as such by their authors’, nonetheless finds the label a useful 
shorthand for his impression that ‘something important has happened to history in the last twenty 
years or so. The great overarching narratives such as Marxism and modernization theory have 
collapsed’.3 But with a little further investigation, we find that even this most widely accepted 
determinant of a (loosely located) late ‘boundary moment’ for modernist approaches to history – 
that is, the break in postmodernity from any sense of a single, universal ‘master narrative’ – may 
not quite suffice to fix modernism within a stable and discrete historical era. 
For one intriguing instance, written rather closer to that era’s supposed ‘collapse’, 
Marshall Berman begins the rich study of ‘the experience of modernity’ he published in 1983 
under the Marxian title All That Is Solid Melts into Air by suggesting, in the face of some ‘bleak’ 
implications he saw in early postmodern theory, that ‘remembering the modernisms of the 
nineteenth century can give us the vision and courage to create the modernisms of the twenty-
first’.4 No doubt those for whom a ‘postmodern’ turn came, instead, with palpable promises of 
liberation from the many oppressive aspects of modernism’s master narratives might well see in 
such a notion of ‘modernisms of the twenty-first century’ (which brings to mind the 1980 essay 
by Jürgen Habermas: ‘Modernity – an Incomplete Project?’) a wholly misguided ‘futuristic 
nostalgia’ (as it were) for cultural proclivities better consigned, after Leon Trotsky, to ‘the 
dustbin of history’.5 These two cases alone, at any rate, might suffice to suggest that any 
delineation of ‘modernism in history’ can itself only be inextricably historical – the product of 
ongoing debates within a contentiously shared ‘era’. One practical way to approach the web of 
contingencies and conveniences that inevitably arises for an essay of this nature is to take 
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Evans’s sense of ‘postmodernism in its more constructive modes’ as a summons to preface any 
selection of exemplary cases in modernist music historiography with an ‘open acknowledgement 
of the historian’s own subjectivity’.6 
To that end, I will begin by recalling, on one hand, the suggestion in Carl Dahlhaus’s 
1983 study Foundations of Music History that the idea of a quasi-coherent ‘generation’ may be 
one of the more robust historiographical constructs, and on the other, the remainder of that 
complete sentence in my first epigraph: ‘Eras are conveniences, particularly for those who never 
experienced them’.7 For if that postmodern ‘boundary moment’ has any substance at all, it 
seems crucial to acknowledge that someone of my generation actually ‘never experienced’ 
modernism in its ‘high’ or ‘classic’ form. Of course the situation has never been simple – indeed 
a bit more retrospection brings the suspicion that those of us born in the ’60s have always 
experienced a thoroughly hybrid perspective on musical modernism and whatever came after.8 
At risk of indulging the ‘pseudo-dialectical’ thinking that Richard Taruskin, in the 
polemical preface to his Oxford History of Western Music, has strenuously challenged in 
Dahlhaus’s Foundations, I find that one useful heuristic framing of this hybrid perspective arises 
from a recognition, at its widest extremes, of a relatively clear opposition between ‘music 
History (capital H)’ and ‘music history (small h)’ – taking the former to mean an approach 
rooted in some notion of universal historical laws, and the latter an approach driven by relations 
to contingent, particular historical events. No argument is needed to identify the philosopher 
Theodor W. Adorno, high priest of ‘negative dialectics’, as by far the most influential 
practitioner of the former. On the other hand, Taruskin affirms his allegiance to the latter when 
stating his determination to discard the ‘tenets of neo-Hegelian art history’ in favour of an 
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‘investigation of the actual causes of aesthetic and stylistic evolution, which are to be found 
within rather than outside the histories of social and political affairs’.9 
Taking these two influential voices as exemplary case studies for inclinations apparent, to 
lesser degrees, across wide spans of literature, in what follows I will offer a brief sketch of their 
stated methodological aims, followed by a selective assessment of their treatment of a few 
specific moments in modern music history. Further exemplifying the ‘subject position’ (as we 
now say) informing this chapter, I will give particular focus, in the latter phases, to the different 
accounts of one of my own specialist interests, the music of Claude Debussy – whose 
longstanding centrality to modern music historiography has found its most startlingly specific 
formulation in Pierre Boulez’s famous claim (in a 1958 encyclopedia article) that modern music 
‘awakens’ in a single piece, the 1894 Prélude à l’après-midi d’un faune.10 
Finally, in partial mitigation of the pseudo-dialectical structure that arises from the 
juxtaposition of Adorno’s ‘History’ with Taruskin’s ‘history’, I will set up some closing thoughts 
by turning back – as a free-floating ‘third term’ rather than a neo-Hegelian ‘synthesis’ – to some 
further writings of Boulez himself. If his most infamous remarks now exemplify an authoritarian 
side of high modernism whose passing nobody could possibly mourn, others, I find, still offer 
surprising sidelights on the question of cultural bias that seems endemic to modernist music 
historiography. No doubt Boulez’s extravagant claim for his most illustrious modern French 
forebear can be deemed, in part, a further instance of the same bias. But at least he was able to 
admit that his nomination of ‘Mallarmé, Debussy and Cézanne’ as an initiatory constellation ‘at 
the root of all modernity’ could seem somewhat chauvinistic (autarcique).11 And his passing 
invocation of Baudelaire, elsewhere, captures an alternative dialectical framing of ‘modernity’ 
that has often been elided in other appropriations of this earlier compatriot, which arguably 
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retains much potential to inform ongoing reflection about modernism and history far beyond the 
boundaries of France alone. 
Adorno 
From the present perspective, the fact that the belated postmodern turn in Anglo-American 
musicology of the late ’80s and early ’90s occurred at the very time when Adorno’s work was 
achieving new and increasingly overweening prominence appears a slightly anomalous feature of 
the historiographical landscape.12 How, we might be tempted to ask, could this high modernist 
critic extraordinaire – post-Hegelian priest of ‘critical theory’, quick to damn all concessions to 
the ‘false consciousness’ of the ‘culture industry’; influential participant in avant-garde cenacles 
like the Darmstadt Ferienkurse, whose death in 1969 irrevocably bound him to the era before 
most postmodern breakthroughs – claim such status amidst what seem, in any judicious 
assessment, exactly contrary critical currents? 
One simple answer: As an early champion, Rose Rosengard Subotnik, put it in the 
preface to an important 1991 essay collection, the discovery of Adorno promised a 
‘reintroduction of moral questions’ into a music academy then almost wholly in thrall to 
‘Empirical’ or ‘analytic’ methods, usually assumed (like the musical subject matter to which they 
were largely applied) to operate wholly free from ideological or political taint.13 But if it is easy 
enough, now, to understand how refreshing Adorno’s extravagantly poetic, morally invested 
‘Continental’ approach must have seemed to many scholars who, chafing within those 
positivistic limits, were also keen to challenge their ideological neutrality, it is hard not to sense 
an unsettling tension between the demandingly austere, Frankfurt School notion of musical ‘truth 
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value’ and the radically more relativistic ‘ethnomusicological’ orientation also hailed, across the 
same generation, for its potential to transform disciplinary practices of musicology.14 
What is most striking in a present re-reading of the work that emerged alongside 
Subotnik’s during the Anglo-American heyday of Adorno’s writing (meaning roughly the decade 
or two from the early ’90s well into the millennium) is the sheer determination of many 
champions to reaffirm his continuing relevance long after the waning of his direct aesthetic 
influence, even while granting the substance and significance of much trenchant critique that had 
also come, over the same years, from many quarters.15 At one level, the phenomenon bespeaks 
a quasi-religious reverence best exemplified in a sweeping assertion Subotnik quotes, at one 
point, from Donald Kuspit: ‘To truly do justice to Adorno – to object to him – one must 
completely submit oneself to him, commit oneself completely to his method, live with it and 
comprehend its effect on life’.16 For those loath to submit in this fashion, more productive lines 
of thought can be glimpsed behind a little terminological echo that crops up in a milder version 
of the same claim, as offered by British Adornian Max Paddison: 
In order to counteract the tendency to become fixated on the individual (and 
exaggerated) elements which make up his argument, it is important that Adorno 
be read in the light of his own method, while at every point (and he is constantly 
changing perspective) the connection has also to be made with the context of his 
theory as a whole.17 
Whatever we think of the mystagogical demand to connect ‘every point’ of his writing with his 
‘theory as a whole’, the confidence with which Paddison, like Kuspit, refers to Adorno’s 
‘method’ invites an inquiry of more practical value for these retrospective reflections on 
‘modernism and history’. 
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What, then, is the Adornian method? Two or three core tenets, it appears, are most often 
emphasized as essential to the approach widely celebrated under the banner of ‘critical theory’. 
First of all, Adorno and Adornians tend to insist that the method rests, at basis, on immanent 
critique of musical works, developed as freely as possible from covert or unexamined 
presupposition. Secondly, we are given to understand that this is a thoroughly dialectical method 
– which means a few things at once. On the broadest level, it proposes an intricately mediated 
relation between art and society, wherein each evolves, independently, in thrall to the Hegelian 
‘objective spirit of history’ – and wherein any ‘authentic’ art must continually strive (and fail) to 
realize a utopian obligation that places it, by definition, in critical relation to contemporary 
commodity culture. On the local level of argument, meanwhile, the method requires unending 
vigilance against reductively monolithic formulations of any given historical concept (thesis) that 
neglect its inextricable interpenetration by its co-defining opposite (antithesis). Finally, many 
critics emphasize, as a third strength of the immanent and dialectical method so defined, the 
ostensible transparency of its own ideological stance, and thus its openness to self-critique.18 
If the outlines of the method seem clear enough, it is surprising to find how often even 
avowed Adornians readily grant serious shortfalls in its execution. On the question of immanent 
critique, for example, Paddison candidly concedes that Adorno’s ‘so-called “immanent analyses” 
of musical works are disappointingly traditional on a technical level, and do not convincingly 
bridge the gap between technical analysis and philosophical interpretation.’19 As for the famous 
dialectical sensibility, on the other hand, what Paddison indulgently characterizes as a ‘rather 
extreme application of Max Weber’s concept of rationalization’ comes into starker focus against 
the background of Berman’s truly dialectical framing of modernity: 
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There is a mode of vital experience – experience of space and time, of the self and 
others, of life’s possibilities and perils – that is shared by men and women all over 
the world today. I will call this body of experience ‘modernity’. To be modern is 
to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, 
growth, transformations of ourselves and the world – and, at the same time, that 
threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we 
are.20 
Adorno’s complete effacement of one side of this ‘mode of vital experience’ (‘adventure, power, 
joy, growth’) under doom-laden mantras about the ‘horror of history’ finds incisive diagnosis in 
one of Berman’s footnotes: ‘In [Georg] Simmel – and later in his youthful followers Georg 
Lukács, T. W. Adorno, and Walter Benjamin – dialectical vision and depth are always entangled, 
often in the same sentence, with monolithic cultural despair’.21 
Such monolithic despair inevitably imparts a distinct slant to Adorno’s views on the kind 
of art that can possibly be deemed ‘authentic’. To assert – in a typical instance – that ‘new music 
[. . .] has taken all the darkness and guilt of the world on itself’, leaves little room for any new 
music that seeks to embrace, however fleetingly, modern modes of ‘adventure’ and ‘joy’.22 Just 
as typical is the fuzziness about the human creative acts that conceivably drive this obligatory 
opposition to history’s horrors and acceptance of the world’s guilt. Attributions of agency to the 
art and music themselves, rather than to anyone who actually makes such things, is characteristic 
of a historiography that locates the ‘spirit of History’, again and again, in ostensibly objective 
‘tendencies of the material’ rather than in any conscious choices on the part of human 
subjects.23 To be sure, Adorno occasionally grants a secondary role to creative subjectivity: ‘in 
immanent reciprocation’, we read in Philosophy of New Music (1947), ‘directives are constituted 
that the material imposes on the composer and that the composer transforms by adhering to 
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them’.24 But just as common are the many passages that efface human agency entirely under an 
anthropomorphic framing of grand abstractions: ‘music concedes the legitimacy of history and 
therefore history would like to quash it’.25 
It is hardly surprising to find that the contrasting ‘small h’ approach to music history 
plays a more negligible role in this method. But it is worth noting one puzzling wobble. If 
anything is clear in Adorno’s modernist historiography, it is the pre-eminent status of 
Schoenberg’s atonal phase – which he is still celebrating in the late essay ‘Vers une musique 
informelle’ (1961) as the moment when new music came closest to matching Beethoven’s earlier 
near-attainment of music’s utopian potential.26 But similar clarity is notably absent from his 
account of twelve-tone technique. Beyond his comfortable acceptance, at one point, of the 
‘didactic’ implications in Ernst Křenek’s comparison of twelve-tone composition with Palestrina 
style, and his direct anticipation, at another, of Boulez’s famously invidious contrast between 
Schoenberg and Webern, Adorno allows himself a more fundamental slippage when, after first 
describing the technique, in Philosophy of New Music, as a product of the music’s ‘proper 
gravitational vector’, he asserts in ‘Vers une musique informelle’ that ‘What stopped the 
development of the “free musical style”, as Alois Haba termed it over thirty years ago, was not 
anything inherent in the music, as Schoenberg may well have imagined, but sociological and 
ideological factors.’27 Such haziness about internal and external explanation, touching so 
central a development in Adorno’s favoured music-historical lineage, seems hard to put down, 
forgivingly, to a rich vein of contradiction. 
To turn to my chosen music-historical test case is to find a similar haziness permeating 
Adorno’s few remarks about Debussy. The key passage in Philosophy of New Music proceeds 
entirely as a gloss on a familiar interdisciplinary cliché: 
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Listening must re-educate itself in order to hear Debussy correctly, not as a 
process of damming up and release but as a juxtaposition of colours and flashes, 
as in a painting. The succession merely displays what, in terms of its own 
meaning, is simultaneous in the way of an eye that wanders over a canvas.28 
We recognize the casual endorsement of the well-worn ‘Impressionist’ trope, whose 
longstanding and widespread acceptance in scholarly and public accounts of Debussy alike may 
make it all too easy to absorb, as well, Adorno’s further claim that ‘the development of 
painting’s productive forces [in France] so prevailed over those of music that the latter 
involuntarily sought refuge in great painting’.29 What is missing from this odd image of French 
music seeking shelter in a more developed art form, however, is any acknowledgement that the 
‘Impressionist’ trope itself has only ever been a pure artefact of reception, with little solid basis 
in immanent musical detail or documented creative affinity. 
As a matter of historical fact it was Schoenberg, not Debussy, who at a key point in his 
development engaged in substantive aesthetic exchanges with an actual painter, Vassily 
Kandinsky, about the new aesthetic challenges now in view with the advent of atonality and 
abstraction. (Indeed the exchange hinged, in part, on questions of spatiality in the two art forms – 
later a key term in Adorno’s critique both of Debussy and Stravinsky.)30 The complete absence 
of any similar documented interest on Debussy’s part has been succinctly noted, back in 1966, 
by Polish musicologist Stefan Jarocinski: 
Contrary to what has often been alleged, there is nowhere to be found in 
[Debussy’s] articles, his correspondence, or even in the recollections of those who 
knew him best, the slightest proof that Impressionist painting had influenced him 
to any extent. On the contrary, [. . .] he repudiated the term Impressionism when 
applied to his music, and employed it himself only in an ironic sense.31 
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No doubt it is still possible for those of a critical-theoretical bent to invoke an authentic, 
‘involuntary’ resonance (to borrow Adorno’s term) between disparate artistic materials at similar 
stages in their respective Histories. But the obvious question arises: Why would such affinity 
obtain primarily, if not solely, between Debussy’s music and a painterly style that had flourished 
in the hands of artists exactly one generation older, rather than with any of the many, wildly 
variegated ‘post-Impressionist’ styles actually in constant, febrile development as he attained 
compositional maturity in the late 1880s and ’90s?32 
In truth, although a deeply interdisciplinary sensibility is often deemed another strength 
of Adorno’s method, it is clear that his sensitivity to actual – immanent – developments in 
French painting of this time was patchy at best. When, for instance, he invokes ‘the passage from 
impressionism to pointillism in painting’ to exemplify a sweeping claim that progress in artistic 
procedures involves ‘a movement towards increasing logical elaboration’, he merely 
demonstrates, once more, the opportunistic selectivity of this ‘History’.33 For the ‘pointillism’ 
of Georges Seurat and Paul Signac et al. was only one of numerous post-Impressionist styles, 
among which many freer approaches (e.g. that of Paul Gauguin, Vincent van Gogh and Paul 
Cézanne) were to prove at least as influential – recall Boulez’s proto-modernist triumvirate – on 
subsequent generations.34 And beyond any quibbling about the most appropriate 
interdisciplinary affinities (which often becomes something of a mug’s game), Adorno’s casual 
resort to this central painterly trope of Debussyan reception spawns a blatant disregard for the 
full range of immanent musical facts. To claim, for example, that in Debussy ‘[t]here is no 
“end”: the piece stops like a painting one has turned away from’, is to ignore a whole lineage of 
actual Debussy pieces – from Pour le piano (1894–1901), through La Mer (1903–5) to all three 
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late chamber sonatas (1915–17) – whose blazingly rhetorical conclusions render such 
interdisciplinary generalizations patently absurd. 
It would be easier to deem Debussy a relatively minor deaf spot in Adorno’s criticism 
were it not that the painting trope also proved pivotal – as in the supposedly parallel development 
from Impressionism to cubism – to his more extensive treatment of Stravinsky.35 There is little 
need to engage in detail, here, with the infamous ‘Stravinsky and the Restoration’ section of 
Philosophy of New Music – characterized even by Robert Hullot-Kentor, in the preface to his 
2006 translation, as ‘easily the most reviled and automatically dismissed of anything [Adorno] 
wrote’.36 But a slightly broader view might serve to test the ‘self-critical’ strengths occasionally 
celebrated in this method. For Adorno returned to Stravinsky years later, in the 1962 essay 
‘Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait’, which some acolytes have found an exemplary instance of 
self-critical reflection.37 
That reading seems strange on the face of it given Adorno’s bald assertion, early in this 
essay, that ‘I see no reason to retract anything that I wrote in 1947.’38 He proceeds to frame, 
hypothetically, a ‘not implausible objection’ he imagines others could direct at his original 
critique, and a (hypothetical) ‘plea for the defence’ of Stravinsky he thinks they may be tempted 
to offer – which includes the (still-hypothetical) charge against him that he imagines they could 
raise: that ‘I violated my own most cherished principles of criticism’ (meaning the commitment 
to immanent analysis). But he answers all such hypotheses with one of his most imperious 
affirmations of a non-negotiable ‘fact’ about music: 
As a temporal art, music is bound to the fact of succession and is hence as 
irrevocable as time itself. By starting it commits itself to carrying on, to becoming 
something new, to developing. What we may conceive of as musical 
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transcendence, namely the fact that at any given moment it has become something 
and something other than what it was, that it points beyond itself – all that is no 
mere metaphysical imperative dictated by external authority. It lies in the nature 
of music and will not be denied.39 
Damning Stravinsky’s temporal processes in this light, he transmutes what is indeed an 
undeniable fact – music must ‘carry on’ in time – into an arbitrary, monolithic insistence that 
only one way of ‘carrying on’ (i.e. ‘developing’, in the Beethovenian and Schoenbergian sense 
central to his own education) can ever count as historically ‘authentic’. 
Hardly a robust instance of self-critique, ‘Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait’ thus proves a 
particularly blatant instance of the thoroughgoing Austro-German bias widely acknowledged by 
Adorno’s champions and detractors alike. But familiar and unignorable as this bias may be, his 
most forgiving readers tend to understate the parochial narrowness of the critical purview it 
supports. When observing, for example, that Adorno ‘seemed to be so identified with his own 
cultural heritage and its aesthetic values that he was quite blind to the different terms of reference 
of any non-European let alone non-Western culture’, Paddison blithely skates past his more 
shocking blindness (or deafness) to the music created not in some distant, exotic culture – or 
even by someone born at a moderate geographical remove, like Stravinsky – but by a composer 
native to Germany’s closest Western European neighbour.40 We must no doubt grant (with 
Paddison) that Adorno was ‘constantly changing perspective’ – and further exploration will find, 
for example, that ‘Vers une musique informelle’ contradicts even the ‘cardinal fact’ that serves 
to damn Stravinsky in ‘A Dialectical Portrait’. (‘It is nowhere laid down that modern music must 
a priori contain such elements of the tradition as tension and resolution, continuation, 
development, contrast and reassertion.’)41 Similarly, the few references to Debussy in the 
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posthumously published Aesthetic Theory have lost all clichéd associations with painting. But 
while nobody would demand dogmatic rigidity as a critical obligation, it is hard not to wonder, in 
the face of such radical shifts of opinion, what can be said to survive as a solid core of this 
music-historical method. 
The suspicion that, much like the music prophetically evoked in ‘Vers une musique 
informelle’, Adorno’s method remains a promissory note towards some as-yet unrealised, truly 
immanent, dialectical and self-critical project only deepens when we read this further frank 
acknowledgement from Subotnik: 
Through a complex process of mediation, which Adorno does not pretend to 
understand or elucidate adequately, a process involving the artist’s early ways of 
perceiving reality (through childhood assimilation of societal structures) and the 
contemporaneous state of artistic materials, techniques and technology (all, like 
form, stemming from outside the imagination), the essential tendencies of a given 
historical moment become translated into the formal aspects of great art.42 
In other words, Adorno ‘does not pretend to understand or elucidate adequately’ even the 
fundamental question – ‘how are we to say that X and Y are related in Z fashion?’ – that, by her 
own account, had first drawn Subotnik out from the narrowly analytic academic confines within 
which she had written a traditional ‘life and works’ dissertation and towards this Continental 
alternative.43 Paddison’s sense, in the mid-90s, that ‘Adorno’s Critical Theory continues to 
make us uncomfortable with received notions of music as splendidly autonomous and somehow 
entirely separate from society and the everyday’ can only seem terribly out-dated now, after a 
few decades of ‘cultural musicology’.44 Perhaps there is more lasting substance in Alistair 
Williams’s narrowly methodological claim, a year or so later, that without such a critical theory 
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(inchoate as it is) ‘modernism’s challenging of traditional aesthetics, its pull away from 
integration and its quest for theoretical understanding could be understood only by a pale 
explanation of technique’.45 But the choice seems too stark. Technique, in music as in all other 
arts, has generally been a means to various human ends. Surely there are better approaches to the 
endlessly fascinating relation between the two than a repeated refurbishment of a mid-twentieth-
century model whose narrow cultural bias has long proved inadequate even to a pluralistic sense 
of Western art music, let alone everything else? 
Taruskin 
When Taruskin, in the polemical preface reprinted at the start of every volume of his Oxford 
History, deems the work of Adorno ‘preposterously overrated’ and damns all the postmodern 
‘new musicologists’ as ‘Adornians to a man or woman’, he clearly stakes a claim to be offering 
just such a better alternative.46 But even without undertaking the thorough investigation needed 
to determine just which particular Adornian sins can be fairly attributed to any of the disparate 
scholars occasionally bundled together (happily or not) under the label ‘new musicology’, a 
careful assessment of the vast survey that follows finds that it, too, proves riven by tensions 
arising from partly incompatible historiographical paradigms. In this case, in fact, unlike the 
postmodern reception of the arch-modernist Adorno, the instability seems built into the very 
foundations. 
For one thing (to borrow again from Evans’s millennial reflections), as a ‘multi-volume 
and “authoritative” synoptic history’, the OHWM seems a distinctly belated contribution to a 
genre whose very ‘idea’ already seemed ‘out of date’ to many historians back in 1997.47 This 
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pervasive tinge of anachronism only deepens with Taruskin’s distinctly postmodernistic 
prefatory claim that, rather than the ‘music itself’, the ‘mediating discourse’ will be the main 
subject of his historical ‘story’ (in his most extreme formulation: ‘the discourse, so often slighted 
in the past, is in fact the story’).48 The claim sits uneasily with the relatively traditional, 
‘narrative’ approach he then, by his own description, adopts for this ‘attempt at a true history’.49 
If a key question about the relation between historical discourses and the worldly truths they 
purport to describe (as has been widely debated after the postmodern turn) seems casually elided 
here, we might also wonder just how well Taruskin’s determination to root such a narrative 
primarily in ‘reception’, of the kind that can give rise to ‘social contention’, really holds up 
across all the highly technical, enthusiastically erudite music analyses that give the OHWM much 
of its considerable bulk.50 
Beyond this rebarbative preface alone, the account of musical modernism in Taruskin’s 
last volumes rests on methodological foundations elaborated more extensively in a couple of 
earlier essays. The first of these, given as a lecture back in 1989 and reprinted with a reflective 
commentary of 2008, challenges what Taruskin sees as the standard telling of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century music history, described in the OHWM as part of the broader ‘neo-Hegelian’ 
and ‘linear’ tale that ‘the arts steadily progress toward a state of ever more perfect autonomy’.51 
This is not the only one of his sallies against hidebound tradition that carries a strong whiff of the 
‘straw man’. As he well knows, even arch-progressivists like Adorno and Boulez saw some eras 
as diversions from the longer-range ‘arc of History’; apart from his new dating, to ca. 1923, of 
the ‘true break’ between nineteenth- and twentieth-century musical worlds (which can only ever 
be arbitrarily imposed), his proposed ‘zigzag’ alternative – i.e. two progressively maximalizing 
‘zigs’ in alternation with two anti-progressive ‘zags’, one in the interwar years, the other at the 
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postmodern turn – does not appear as radically unfamiliar as he seems to think.52 What is more 
distinctive is the pair of terms by which he purports to bring the messy variety of musical culture 
under each vector of this jagged ‘superperiodization’. 
Ironically, the key terms in question, as first presented in the essay ‘The Poietic Fallacy’ 
of 2004 and scattered throughout the OHWM, could well be said to infuse this story of musical 
modernism with the same quasi-dialectical thinking Taruskin finds so execrable in Dahlhaus. 
Borrowing the well-known distinction between poiesis (artistic creation) and esthesis (audience 
reception) first introduced to music by semiotician Jean Molino, he defines the ‘fallacy’ he labels 
with the first term as ‘the conviction that what matters most (or, more strongly yet, that all that 
matters) in a work of art is the making of it, the maker’s input’.53 As he sees it, the enthralment 
of most previous stories about modernism to this ‘poietic fallacy’ accounts in large part for the 
oft-noted alienation of ‘new music’ from a wide audience. This charge, in turn, drives his 
determination to focus this ‘true’ story, instead, on esthesis – and thus to write ‘a view of 
“serious” music that takes adequate account of its function as a communicative medium’.54 
As an aside, we might note how this programme simplifies the actual practice of ‘History 
with a capital H’ – within which the agency of ‘the maker’ often proves quite elusive and 
ambiguous. Much more important, however, is the ease with which the quasi-dialectical 
opposition of poiesis and esthesis elides a crucial ‘third term’. Noting that Molino’s original 
formulation had also included ‘a niveau neutre, a neutral level, that analysed the structure of the 
message itself’, Taruskin suggests that this third or middle term was discarded ‘once it was 
realized that analysis itself was an esthesic function’.55 The realization may indeed be 
irrefutable. But the problematic label ‘niveau neutre’ aside, it hardly follows that the musical 
phenomena themselves simply do not exist, in their material and sonorous facticity, before 
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analysis takes place. We may never be able to analyze music in a value-neutral way, but we can 
easily describe its constituent facts falsely (say, by taking forte for piano, flute for fiddle, fugue 
for aria). To believe otherwise is to accept a discursive extreme in postmodern historiography 
that has been thoroughly debunked (in my reading of Evans) through several late-century debates 
– and that clearly holds little real attraction for Taruskin, given his frequent appeals to historical 
‘fact’ to contradict the discursive misrepresentations of others.56 
If, all claims to some higher truth aside, the OHWM inevitably deploys both facts and 
discourses selectively to buttress prior musical and historical investments, the elaboration of its 
‘zigzag’ linear historiography illustrates, above all, the perils of over-schematic musical 
periodization. Recalling his commitment to tracing the causes of stylistic evolution in the social 
and political realm, it will come as no surprise to find the First World War identified as the main 
cause of the first ‘zag’. Long seen to mark a turn to greater objectivity in all the arts, this 
worldwide cataclysm now comes under Taruskin’s quasi-dialectical scheme as the cause of what 
he calls ‘the “poietic” bias (the emphasis on the “making” of the composition rather than on its 
“effect”) that increasingly characterized advanced composing-practice after the Great War’.57 
But what emerges most vividly from the discursive context surrounding this idea of a new 
‘poietic bias’ – apart from a sense that its human source seems to float, disconcertingly, between 
composers and later analysts – is the sheer, unruly variety of the music actually created in this 
‘period’. 
Perhaps the clearest instance of the instability inherent in any such attribution of a broad 
stylistic change to a single social and political cause is the discussion, on a single page, of three 
closely contemporaneous operas by Paul Hindemith. Two, we read, ‘maintained prewar 
“maximalist” styles (the first “post-Strauss,” the second “post-Debussy”)’, while the third 
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‘showed signs of postwar irreverence for high artistic values’.58 Are we to understand the war 
as the cause of both of these stylistic choices, or just the typical ‘postwar’ one? Perhaps the case 
of Hindemith, at least, seems relatively easy to resolve – given Taruskin’s sense of increasing 
emphasis rather than clear caesura – with a look ahead to the greater ‘objectivity’ of his later 
Gebrauchsmusik. But the puzzle of causality becomes more pressing in the account of Alban 
Berg, a figure at the heart of the neo-Hegelian lineage propounded by Adorno (his one-time 
student). For Taruskin, Berg’s music offers a rare case of dialectical synthesis: 
His expressive aims remained traditionally humanistic, concerned with the 
representation, and possible transmission, of subjective feelings like erotic love 
(in the Lyric Suite), or grief and consolation (in the Concerto). It was to these ends 
that Berg sublimated the intellectual curiosity that attracted him to technical tours 
de force. His obsession with motivic and harmonic asymmetries acted as a useful 
counterfoil to his representational bent, enabling his music to be at once eclectic 
and economical in a way that interests analysts, and giving his music, to a perhaps 
greater degree than that of the other early Viennese atonalists, strong appeal on 
both the poietic and esthesic planes.59 
Suggestive as this description of a distinctive compositional accomplishment might be, it seems 
difficult to explain such a rich admixture of ‘expressive aims’ and ‘intellectual curiosity’ – in 
two works written in 1926 and 1935, respectively – as the result of a single socio-historical 
event. 
For all the scorn Taruskin pours on the ‘pseudo-dialectical “method” ’ he finds in 
Foundations of Music History (and deceptively distils to a crude question: ‘Is art history the 
history of art, or is it the history of art?’) Dahlhaus’s thoughts on the ‘problems of social history’ 
actually remain directly relevant to the questions that arise from this ‘superperiodization’, which 
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inevitably throws up works (and entire oeuvres – say, by Erich Wolfgang Korngold or Edgard 
Varèse) that prove exceptions, in various ways, to the ‘debunking, materialist, objective, and 
antimetaphysical spirit of postwar disillusion’.60 Rather than having to say, with a temporal 
locution typical of Zeitgeist historiography, that the ‘decadence’ of Korngold’s ‘sumptuous 
expressionist drama’ (e.g. Das Wunder der Heliane, 1926) was ‘a little old-fashioned in the age 
of neue Sachlichkeit’, it would be better to accept that the ‘age’ itself has only ever been a 
discursive ‘convenience’ (see again my epigraph) – its label ‘bolted on’ to a ‘totality’ better seen 
in light of Dahlhaus’s gloss on leading annales historian Fernand Braudel: 
The structures [. . .] that coexist at any given time, interacting to constitute or 
determine an historical circumstance, differ from each other not only in respect of 
their age, i.e. how far back they extend into the past and the timespan allotted to 
them, but also in the rate at which they alter. The historian Fernand Braudel spoke 
of the various ‘rhythms’ of coexisting structures, ranging from the geographic 
conditions of a culture to the styles of its art. And, to use a musical metaphor, 
there is cause to doubt whether the overlapping tempos can be reduced to a 
common underlying metre (though some feel that the succession of generations 
gives a certain ‘natural rhythm’ to the history of art). There is, strictly speaking, 
no such thing as ‘Time’ in the singular but only ‘times’ in the plural, the times of 
overlapping structures in conflicting rhythms’.61 
From this perspective, indeed, Taruskin’s ostensibly event-driven superperiodization could seem, 
in its more forced applications, just as polemically selective a construct as Adorno’s ostensibly 
immanent ‘objective historical spirit’.62 
The possibility that ‘les extrèmes se touchent’ here can be supported with a closer look at 
Taruskin’s objections to the ‘capital H’ tale he roundly rejects. In a crucial passage of his 
preface, he identifies the ‘vice’ that ‘vitiated’ the work of Adorno (and rapidly aged that of the 
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‘new musicologists’) as the assumption ‘that the meaning of artworks is fully vested in them by 
their creators, and is simply “there” to be decoded by a specially gifted interpreter’. He 
continues: 
[This] is, all pretenses aside, still an authoritarian discourse and an asocial one. It 
still grants oracular privilege to the creative genius and his prophets, the gifted 
interpreters. It is altogether unacceptable as a historical method, although it is part 
of history and, like everything else, deserving of report. The historian’s trick is to 
shift the question from “What does it mean?” to “What has it meant?” That move 
is what transforms futile speculation and dogmatic polemic into historical 
illumination.63 
What is strange here is the uncritical assumption that the interrogative shift so described will 
automatically prevent the historian from granting ‘oracular privilege’ to some other 
‘authoritarian discourse’ in service of a different, externally based but no less dogmatic polemic. 
More bluntly: the ‘historian’s trick’, as Taruskin puts it, remains incomplete so long as his new 
question lacks a crucial qualifier: ‘What has it meant . . . and to whom?’ 
As it happens, this missing qualifier proves particularly damaging to the account of 
Debussy in volume IV of the OHWM. For a start, it appears that Taruskin, while deciding to 
relieve this composer of the ‘Ur-modernist’ status he was happy to affirm in a review written 
back in 1989, has also had second thoughts about his ‘Impressionism’ – a cliché he once treated 
with apt circumspection, but now (in an exact reversal of Adorno) accepts with little more than a 
dutiful caveat.64 He gives no evidentiary justification for this change of mind – indeed none, to 
my knowledge, exists. It could be that he has simply found, over the years, that the parallel with 
a supposedly ‘objective’ style of painting (as it has often been understood) fits well with the 
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claims about a modernist ‘dehumanization of art’ famously propounded in a 1925 essay by 
Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, which he first draws into his story alongside the early 
‘French modernists’ Debussy and Satie and grants fully oracular privilege through many 
subsequent chapters (see also the introduction to this volume). 
Whatever ‘historical illumination’ Ortega might bring to later, more appropriate episodes, 
Taruskin’s wholesale adoption of his dehumanized hearing of Debussy perfectly illustrates how a 
prior commitment to authoritarian discourse can enforce a selective disregard for historical and 
musical facts. It would be hard, for example, to pack more bias and inaccuracy into this single 
paragraph: 
One finds representations aplenty in [Debussy’s] music of the sea, of the wind, of 
gardens in the rain and balconies in the moonlight, but of humans few unless 
viewed en masse and from afar (‘Fêtes’ [. . .]), or unless mythical (fauns, sirens), 
artificial (‘Golliwogg’, his daughter’s Negro doll [. . .]), or already embodied in 
art (‘Danseuses de Delphes’ [. . .] the first of the Préludes, which title evokes not 
the dancers themselves but the Greek vase on which they are painted).65 
Even the initial nod to a few ‘nature’ titles (La mer, ‘Jardins sous la pluie’) sidesteps a whole 
contemporary discourse about the interpenetration of artistic representations with the experience 
of their human perceivers – as in Mallarmé’s stated ideal: ‘peindre non la chose, mais l’effet 
qu’elle produit’.66 The reference to humans ‘en masse and from afar’ in ‘Fêtes’ coolly 
suppresses the fact that the march episode in question only begins at ‘distant’ pianissimo – but 
then approaches, through fifty-four bars of crescendo, to a vividly proximate fortissimo with full 
brass and percussion. Taruskin gives no justification for deeming Debussy’s ‘mythical’ figures 
any less ‘human’ in symbolic implication than, say, the Rhine maidens and dwarves (et al.) in 
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Wagner’s Ring, nor for assuming that the stately rhythms of ‘Danseuses de Delphes’ should be 
heard to evoke an inert image – what, in truth, would that sound like? – rather than the hieratic, 
choreographed gestures it surely brought to mind.67 
Against any suggestion that such selective hearing and description remains open to 
interpretation, I would note the starker omission, here, of all the more overtly ‘human’ Debussy 
Préludes – from the well-known ‘La fille aux cheveux de lin’, through ‘La sérénade 
interrompue’ (presumably played and heard, and interrupted, by someone), to ‘La danse de Puck’ 
and ‘Minstrels’. (If some such pianistic characterizations are mediated by literary ‘artifice’, so 
too, of course, were many in Schumann or Liszt).68 But this slight widening of the lens does not 
yet capture the even broader elision behind Taruskin’s blithe Ortegan assertion ‘but of humans 
few’. To focus only on the instrumental music, in service of this polemical generalization, is to 
ignore or efface the human implications in all of Debussy’s vocal music – notably including the 
several dozen mélodies that embodied (often in the triptych form that stands as his signal 
contribution to the ‘song cycle’ genre) the most overt and disparate expressions of poetic 
personae and imagery across his whole career.69 
This last point brings to mind a telling remark in Gary Tomlinson’s 2007 review of the 
OHWM. Beyond challenging the way that Taruskin, posing as a privileged ‘medium’ of music 
history, ‘appears to want to sustain the illusion that his story was conveyed to him by the traces 
of the past he examines’, Tomlinson also notes a stale air of scholarly familiarity clinging to 
much of the repertoire selected for close attention.70 Radical historiographical posturing aside, 
he suggests, the decisions about what and what not to include (about which Taruskin expresses 
shocking complacency) seem to him largely to re-enshrine a pre-existing canon of ‘the sum of 
the efforts of historical musicologists across much of the twentieth century’.71 We have already 
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glimpsed the insidious effects of such investment in the vagaries of prior musicological interest: 
it will be forever impossible to free Debussy from the Impressionist cliché so long as we find 
historical ‘truth value’ in the mere fact that so many scholars have been happy to repeat it. But a 
more unsettling line of concern can emerge, I think, by considering two other, interrelated 
questions. 
First of all: Why have the mélodies, one of the genres for which Debussy wrote most 
often, been granted so little importance in standard music histories that Taruskin can readily 
overlook their significance for a full understanding of his art? And second, why is it that Ortega 
found it so easy to project the ‘dehumanization’ he heard in 1920s Stravinsky back to Debussy, 
whose radically different motivations should be abundantly clear from the scattering of the word 
‘expressif’ through scores that also bear countless more precisely human indications, from 
‘joyeux’ to ‘passionément’ to ‘comme un tendre et triste regret’? 
Some answers may emerge with a bit more thought about the missing qualifier in that 
‘historian’s trick’ (‘What has it meant . . . and to whom?’). Given that Ortega wrote very little of 
substance about music, many musicologists will likely first encounter his remarks on Debussy 
and Stravinsky in the OHWM.72 In this context, his Latinate name may all too easily suggest a 
healthy Mediterranean perspective – as in Friedrich Nietzsche’s late rejection of Wagnerian 
‘diseases’ for the refreshing clarity of Georges Bizet – behind his hearing of French and Russian 
modernism.73 The truth is quite the opposite. Ortega’s intellectual and aesthetic proclivities 
were in fact thoroughly and passionately Germanic. Their deepest roots lie in the neo-Kantian 
philosophy he studied in Marburg – a town to which he later attributed ‘half of my hopes and 
nearly all of my intellectual discipline’.74 Famously characterized as ‘the man who liked to 
think of himself as a twentieth-century Goethe’, he was granted a prominent speaking role at the 
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poet’s 1949 bicentenary.75 And this ‘Germanism’, which he saw as the essential ingredient for 
Spain’s claim to a fully European destiny, found ample illustration, for example, in the marked 
predominance he gave to German writers in a series of translations for The Library of Twentieth-
Century Ideas, and in the name of his only son: Miguel Germán.76 
This pronounced ‘Germanist’ leaning seems to me to impinge directly on the distorted 
account of Debussy’s music Taruskin offers under Ortega’s oracular guidance. For if Adorno 
was so in thrall to Austro-German ‘development’ that he could not hear any other approach to 
musical time as authentic, Taruskin takes from Ortega an equally narrow sense of musical 
expression, which can only have originated in the decades of discourse that has consistently 
located the pinnacle of such expression in the compositional lineage of German Idealism. It is 
only from this unacknowledged, monolithic perspective, I suggest, that it has proven so easy for 
both to ignore all those expressif indications (and sounds) – because Debussy’s music expresses 
‘passion’ and ‘tenderness’ and the like by other means than those long heard to define Western 
musical ‘expression’ tout court.77 
The towering irony here – Taruskin, so polemically opposed to Teutonic music-historical 
imperialism, imports into his hearing of Debussy a Germanic bias that differs only in kind from 
Adorno’s – rests on a larger, even more basic point. Ortega’s idea of ‘dehumanization’, like 
anyone else’s proposed distinction between acts and creations more or less characteristically 
human, could only ever be inextricably culturally contingent.78 Some reinforcement of this 
point, were it needed, can readily be found in a baldly relativistic invocation of the same idea 
that appeared, just a few years before Ortega’s essay, in a controversial publication by an 
eminent native Germanist. In this passage from his Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man (1918), 
Thomas Mann first answers one peevish question only to end with another: 
4 Modernism and history 
What is, then, this development, this progress I have been speaking of? Well, to 
indicate what it is about, I need a handful of shamelessly ugly, artificial words. It 
is about the politicization, literarization, intellectualization, and radicalization of 
Germany. It aims at her “humanization” in the Latin-political sense, and her 
dehumanization in the German one. It aims, to use the favourite word, the 
battlecry and hosanna of civilization’s literary man, at the democratization of 
Germany, or, to summarize everything and to bring it over a common 
denominator: it aims at her de-Germanization. And I should have a part in all this 
mischief?79 
In short, Ortega’s ostensibly universal and objective characterization appears here, in words 
written during the shell-shocked aftermath of the Great War, as a contingent and contested 
emergence from centuries of debate over the relative values of French civilization and German 
Kultur. 
This long, internecine struggle clearly complicates any monolithic conception of Western 
(or even Western European) culture. And some of its more precise relevance for musicological 
reflections on ‘modernism and history’ might start to emerge with a slight step beyond the 
boundaries of Western Europe. As Taruskin points out, the music of Hungarian composer Béla 
Bartók gave Adorno – who mischaracterized it, with that of the Czech Leoš Janáček, as the 
‘product of a rural or agrarian society’ – yet one more occasion to exercise his ‘smug 
ethnocentric bias’.80 But the same music inspires Taruskin himself to what seems, in a long 
view, suspiciously like a blatant double standard. Back in 1989 he caricatured Debussy, 
primarily on the basis of his writings rather than his music, as someone who demanded ‘an 
absolute demarcation between popular culture and high culture’.81 Perhaps this ‘elitist’ charge 
largely falls away from the OHWM because it is impossible to maintain in the same pages as the 
little example from ‘Golliwog’s Cakewalk’. Even so, there remains a telling disjunction between 
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Taruskin’s dogged riffs on the ‘dehumanized’ Debussy and the complex, multi-dimensional 
humanity he grants the younger composer: ‘Bartók was torn, like all educated Magyars, both 
between the universal and the particular and between the elite and the popular.’82 
Even without the suppressed charge of elitism, we might well wonder how this Bartók 
could have felt, on discovering Debussy’s ‘dehumanized’ music, a similar ‘impact on his 
development to his discovery of peasant song itself’. Maybe we are to understand the impact 
solely in terms of, say, ‘the prevalence of seventh chords [. . .] often moving in parallel à la 
Debussy’ – as in Taruskin’s account of the Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta (1936).83 
But (to borrow one of his own terms of critique) the paired reference to Debussy and ‘peasant 
song’ carries subtler human implications than such shallow ‘techno-essentialism’ can allow.84 
For when Bartók recalled the revelation modern French music had brought to a whole generation 
of Hungarians hitherto in thrall to Germanic models, he specifically highlighted the different 
approach to song he found in Debussy, attributing it to his ‘facility to reach back to the 
declamation of the ancient French language’.85 He thus identified one inspirational model for 
his own new, parlando rubato style of lyrical expression (as in the middle movement of Music 
for Strings) – which he drew, in significant part, from the distinct accentuations and inflections 
of his own native tongue. 
The unacknowledged cultural relativism lurking behind that deceptively universal claim 
of ‘dehumanization’ thus comes into focus, from this perspective, as a deafness to different 
ideals of musical lyricism. Debussy’s mélodies all too easily fall away from a story told in 
Ortega’s thrall, because their acute sensitivity to the declamatory nuances of the French language 
places them at a marked remove from the more melody-dominated song tradition inherited from 
a different, deceptively universal ideal of Volkstümlichkeit.86 No doubt the question remains as 
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to why it has also proven so easy, within this radically selective hearing, to efface all the 
‘expressif’ aspects of the instrumental music as well. But leaving this further query for another 
time, I think the surprisingly similar bias here exposed in Adorno and Taruskin might best serve 
as a pivot towards concluding reflections if we note, in marked contrast, the more finely 
relativistic perspective offered on this very issue by Boulez – a figure often charged with quite 
the opposite historiographical impulses. 
Within a passing reference to the long debate over the relative value of ‘pure vocality, in 
the conventional sense’ and song that ‘reproduces as faithfully as possible the inflections of 
spoken language’, Boulez proposes, at one point, a suggestive parallel between ‘the antinomy of 
Italian opera and French opera’ during the mid-eighteenth century Querelle des bouffons and that 
of ‘Wagner and Debussy’ much later.87 We can question the complete accuracy of this parallel 
while leaving the basic point intact. In the eighteenth century, as in the early twentieth, the 
debate was never really about how and how not to be ‘human’ – it was rather about the particular 
forms of human expression various hearers were willing to validate from their own cultural 
perspective. On this point at least, Boulez proved a more open-minded listener than either 
Adorno or Taruskin to the human possibilities of modernist music. 
Conclusion: Boulez ( . . . und Baudelaire ist auch 
dabei) 
‘Open-minded’ is perhaps not the first adjective that comes to mind for a figure who first enters 
the OHWM under a charge of ‘violence’ and ‘frantically coercive rhetoric’.88 Taruskin is 
referring, of course, to the most infamous of all neo-Hegelian music-historical decrees – as 
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pronounced by Boulez not once but twice, in slightly different forms. The later version, in the 
essay ‘Possibly . . . ’ of May 1952, is the most plainly coercive: ‘any musician who has not 
experienced – I do not say understood, but fully experienced – the necessity of dodecaphonic 
language is USELESS. For his entire work falls short of the needs of his time’.89 But in a 
different essay published a few months earlier, ‘Schoenberg is Dead’ (given the date, the very 
title – as Taruskin remarks – a ‘shocking provocation’), the similarly intransigent assertion that 
‘any composer is useless who does not pursue the path of serialism’ brings, with its continuation, 
a wry aside: ‘(which does not mean that every composer will be useful in the contrary case)’.90 
The addition may seem trivial – but it actually amounts to a frank admission that 
Boulez’s coercive bombast rests, at basis, not on any pressing regard for ‘the needs of the time’ 
but on an irreducibly subjective notion of what he himself, on the authority of his own 
undoubtedly extraordinary gifts, deigns to find artistically useful. Such slippage from a 
notionally universal sense of historical responsibility to a narrowly self-congratulatory solipsism 
has perhaps been all too common across much of modernist historiography. It is relatively easy, 
for instance, to trace back (in a couple of close variants) into my chosen proponents of ‘History’ 
and ‘history’. 
Consider, for a start, Adorno’s 1950 response to early criticism of his Philosophy of New 
Music: 
As a consequence of the philosophy for which I am responsible, [they say], I have 
implicitly applied to music a concept of objective spirit that asserts itself over and 
above the heads of individual artists as well as beyond the merits of individual 
works. This concept is as foreign today to everyday consciousness as it is self-
evident to my own spiritual experience.91 
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On the other hand, Taruskin answers Charles Rosen’s critique of the last volume of the OHWM 
(which adduces Cold War tensions as a cause of just about everything in late twentieth-century 
musical culture) with a similar appeal to subjective experience – now of a worldly, not spiritual, 
nature: 
I believe it is fair to say that the Cold War gave Americans a far greater scare than 
any of the actual wars our armies fought overseas. (And not even the Civil War 
threatened massive civilian casualties.) How could anyone’s psychic equilibrium 
remain undisturbed? (Mine was definitely unbalanced: I could never take 
seriously plans or promises that had to do with anything that lay more than a few 
days in the future.) How could the artistic expressions of such psyches fail to 
reflect that disturbance?92 
In reply, Rosen urbanely deflates this solipsistic hyperbole. ‘For me, by contrast’, he writes, ‘the 
cold war years were a time of hope and looking forward. I got a Ph.D., made my first recordings 
and my New York debut, and obtained a two-year Fulbright fellowship to work in Paris’.93 He 
leaves us to fill in the blanks: however much Taruskin might dramatize his Cold War memories 
to support an extravagant historiographical conceit, a glance at his publication list will find that 
he, too, managed to fulfil at least a few long-term plans amidst those unbalancing world-
historical disturbances.94 
He would have done better to recall his own cautions against over-simplistic accounts, for 
example, of the experience of the composer Karl Amadeus Hartmann under the Nazis. ‘One’s 
tendency in retrospect’, he writes in the OHWM, ‘is to imagine life under totalitarianism in terms 
of stark choices and moral extremes. Real-life conditions are seldom so clear-cut.’95 Directly 
relevant to his own totalizing sense of Cold War culture, this more nuanced view – which 
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permits him the eminently sensible acknowledgement that ‘people are inconstant and 
inconsistent’ – can also help forestall any over-hasty ‘demonization’ of Boulez as a quasi-
totalitarian enforcer of post-Webernian serial doctrine. In fact, a brief comparative glance to 
Boulez’s words, alongside Taruskin’s and Adorno’s, on two brilliant ballet scores of 1913 – 
Debussy’s Jeux and Stravinsky’s Le Sacre du printemps – can begin to suggest who was the 
more catholic listener to serial and non-serial music alike. 
Dutiful caveats forgotten, Taruskin saves his laziest concession to painterly cliché for 
Jeux, which he deems the ‘ultimate masterpiece of “impressionism” ’ based on a few generalities 
about ‘harmonic and coloristic subtlety’, piano dynamics and ‘kaleidoscopically shifting motivic 
patterns’.96 Boulez, by contrast, finds the unique temporal unfolding of this quicksilver work 
the stimulus to a new, post-architectural formal metaphor: 
One must experience the whole work to have a grasp of its form, which is no 
longer architected, but braided [tressée]; in other words, there is no distributive 
hierarchy in the organization of ‘sections’ (static sections: themes; dynamic 
sections: developments) but successive distributions in the course of which the 
various constituent elements take on a greater or lesser functional importance. 
The passage may bear a techno-essentialist odour, but the inspired poetic image (think of all the 
hair symbolism in Debussy) nonetheless invites a more temporally imaginative hearing than any 
impressionistic overview. Still, a yet wider gulf opens between Adorno and Boulez on 
Stravinsky. Adorno’s non-dialectical hearing leads ultimately to a disdainful sniff: ‘There is 
something intrinsically amiss with Stravinsky’s music; “il y a quelque chose qui ne va pas”.’97 
By contrast, in the early pages of his essay ‘Stravinsky Remains’, Boulez poses a reflective 
question about the interrelation of stylistic strengths and weaknesses: 
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It is undeniable [. . .] that Stravinsky possesses, to a lesser degree, the sense of 
development – that is, of sonorous phenomena undergoing constant renewal. 
Maybe we will judge this a weakness – and indeed it is; but might I be allowed to 
think that this is also one of the principal sources of that rhythmic force that he 
found necessary to deploy in order to face up to the difficulty of writing?98 
He then makes good on Adorno’s omission by providing a lengthy and detailed immanent 
analysis of Le sacre, focused above all on the rhythmic dimension so easily denigrated under the 
other’s ethnocentric bias.99 
While fans of the dialectic may thus be tempted to hail, in Boulez, a mid-century 
synthesis of Austro-German and Franco-Russian – i.e. Webernian and Stravinskyan – modernist 
streams, I will take two different, more broadly suggestive aspects of his writings as openings to 
my concluding reflections. The first concerns the thoroughly Eurocentric bias apparent both in 
Adorno’s ‘critical theory’ and Taruskin’s OHWM.100 Boulez, whose appreciation of intra-
European cultural divisions has been noted previously (and whose prominence within a once-
imperial power inevitably implies considerable Eurocentric privilege), occasionally offers 
glimpses, as well, of a yet broader cultural relativism. It may be hard, after the influential 
challenges of Edward Said and his followers, to read even the most laudatory reference to 
‘musics of the Near and Far East’ as wholly free of patronizing ‘orientalism’ (not to say crass 
generalization).101 But when Boulez, in an essay titled after Paul Klee, ‘À la limite du pays 
fertile’, recognizes that the ‘non-harmonic character’ of ‘Hindu music’ allows it, at once, a 
greater intervallic and rhythmic complexity than much Western art music, he arguably registers 
genuine respect for different orders of creative accomplishment.102 And in his elaborations on 
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the similar musical openness once shown by Debussy, he pushes beyond such poietic concerns to 
touch on musical esthesis as well. 
The key passage in ‘La corruption dans les encensoirs’ opens with an apologetic note of 
over-familiarity, then nods in passing to the crucial point: 
We have elaborated quite enough, by now, on the surprise and impact caused in 
Debussy, during the 1889 Exposition, by the Annamite theatre, the Javanese 
dancers, and the sonority of the gamelan. Paradoxically, it is the shock of a 
tradition codified differently, but just as powerfully, as the tradition of the West, 
that precipitates the rupture of the new music with the traditional European 
elements: we might well ask whether it was not the sheer ignorance that such 
other conventions could exist that provoked such powerful impressions of liberty. 
As the highlighted phrase makes clear, Boulez understands the revelation of non-Western musics 
to lie not only in their ‘richer scales’, more ‘supple rhythms’, or ‘totally different’ instruments. 
Rather, as he puts it, ‘it was above all the poetics [la poétique] of these far Eastern musics that 
enforced their corrosive influence’. The close kinship of his poétique with Taruskin’s poiesis 
must not confuse the point. For when Boulez invokes, alongside Debussy, the painters Van Gogh 
and Klee and the poet Paul Claudel – all forced, by various exotic encounters, towards a 
scepticism about the ‘supremacy of [European] culture’ – he clearly implies that the issue was 
not just one of technical means, but of the equally powerful expressive and representational 
effects such artists were able to sense (however dimly) in methods radically different from those 
whose supremacy had long gone unquestioned.103 
The familiarity of the story of ‘Debussy and the exotic’, which has only deepened since 
Boulez’s essay, should not defuse the profound historiographical questions it raises. For if the 
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notion of a ‘universal History’ – in the Hegelian sense of my ‘capital H’ – has by some accounts 
proven an uncomfortable import even for the closest neighbours of the Germanic context from 
which it first arose, how much more problematic must it seem when forced outward, through and 
beyond the furthest outposts of Europe’s former colonies?104 In fact, in a further striking irony, 
the clearest illustration of the perils of ‘conceptual imperialism’ that lurk behind such careless 
extensions of Eurocentric claims about musical history and experience alike can be found in the 
very paragraph in which Taruskin most pointedly challenges the presumed ‘universality’ of the 
German tradition. Compare his first sentence with the last two: 
Since Wagner’s time, the German art of music had brought to a pitch of 
perfection the most consummately developed technique ever devised for 
representing the idealized experience of subjective feeling in tones. Philosophers 
and psychologists who have reflected upon the methods, highly manipulative in 
several meanings of the word, by which composers in the German tradition 
achieved this representation, have tended to fall under its spell. They have 
attributed universality to a local, highly specialized idiom. They have cast it in 
essential terms, as the culminating realization of music’s intrinsic or ‘absolute’ 
properties.105 
It is bizarre to find that closing challenge to others’ presumptions of ‘universality’ so soon after 
Taruskin’s own ringing claim for the ‘supremacy’ – recall Boulez – of German music’s 
expressive idiom (‘the most consummately developed technique ever devised’). How could 
anyone support such a claim, given that none of us will ever attain a fully ‘-emic’ receptivity (as 
the anthropologists might have it) to the ‘subjective feeling’, idealized or otherwise, on offer 
through the world’s unencompassable variety of musical techniques? 
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The second guiding thread I will draw from Boulez, finally, might offer a way to balance 
the marked tilt towards debunking critique that has characterized this essay so far with a more 
positive – though necessarily provisional – programme for further thought about ‘modernism and 
history’. Again, the key passage appears in ‘Corruption in the Censers’: 
What does [modernism] consist of? It is difficult to answer very precisely. 
‘Modernism’, says Baudelaire, ‘is the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent, one 
half of art, of which the other half is the eternal and the immutable’.106 
This paraphrase of Baudelaire’s famous 1863 essay ‘The Painter of Modern Life’ may, again, 
breathe a deceptive air of familiarity. But in truth, the slightly misleading nature of Boulez’s 
excerpt proves exemplary of a widespread tendency, in later reception, to read the essay too 
simply – as if Baudelaire did indeed locate modernism solely in that one, ‘contingent’ half of art, 
rather than in the dialectical interplay between this ‘fugitive’ element and a countervailing urge 
towards the ‘eternal’.107 Maybe, after the waning of imperialistic ‘Histories’ and ‘histories’ 
alike, this subtler, dual sense of the modernist aesthetic could still prove of lasting diagnostic (if 
never prescriptive) value for further historical stories about modernism and its successors.108 
The exemplary aesthetic range that allowed Baudelaire to include both the little-known 
sketch artist Constantin Guys and a composer as monumentally influential as Wagner in his 
pantheon of modernist art can suggest the catholic inclusivity this diagnostic conceit might 
allow. In other words, if it permits us to ask – not from a poietic or esthesic point of view, but in 
full appreciation of the endlessly rich interplay between the two – how finely any art whatsoever 
captures the most fugitive social, technological, or personal concerns of its modern moment, it 
might also invite us to weigh whether, and if so how, it refracts such contingencies through any 
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of the various concepts human cultures have occasionally invested with eternal value: number or 
nature; the nation or the folk; the mythic, the ancestral, or the sacred. We need not insist on such 
interplay in all cases, for the Baudelairean dialectic encompasses its own extremes – say, at one 
end, the non- or anti-art movements whose attempted subversion of all established sanctions of 
lasting value distinguishes them from more institutional modernisms as a true ‘avant-garde’, and 
at the other, perhaps, such rigorously conventional products as can be found within the more 
stringent reaches of the neoclassical and serial Stravinsky.109 
It would be tempting to suggest that the same dialectic could even prove illuminating for 
musical encounters well beyond the post-colonial periphery of Europe, were that not just to court 
a different kind of conceptual imperialism. For apart from his oracular insights into Parisian 
modernity, Baudelaire also claims a prominent place, of course, in the history of Western 
exoticism – indeed, one all too exemplary for its overlap with a closely related proclivity for 
masculinist, objectifying erotic fantasy. To choose him as my valedictory guide, then, makes it 
all the more pressing to acknowledge, once more, the ‘subject position’ that has led me, in this 
chapter, to re-enshrine (even in challenging it) the authoritarian and individualistic 
historiographical perspective of a white, male, Eurocentric triumvirate – Adorno, Taruskin, 
Boulez – whose claim to speak, from their own subjective experience, for all of ‘modernism and 
history’ has long been open to challenge from a widely diverse range of other perspectives. 
Maybe that choice of representative voices now seems a sad concession to Dahlhaus’s 
dispiriting (and fatalistic) suggestion that ‘the canon upon which music historiography is based is 
transmitted by tradition: historians do not compile it so much as encounter it.’110 But it might, 
more generously, be taken to reflect a (perhaps belated) need to reckon with those domineering 
voices at the current stage in ‘the evolution of my own thinking’ (see my second, Boulezian 
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epigraph). Maybe such a reckoning still holds some slight value even for historians much further 
along with the revisionist projects necessary to secure various ‘Others’ – from Emily Dickinson, 
Gertrude Stein and Virginia Woolf through Berthe Morisot, Suzanne Valadon and Sonia 
Delaunay to Louis Armstrong, Thelonious Monk and John Coltrane – an honoured place 
alongside Boulez’s three Belle époque Frenchmen in the shifting constellations of ‘modernism 
and history’. It is with an eye to those more diverse vistas (and beyond, to farther-flung 
modernisms as yet unchampioned) that we could indeed grant the final word to Baudelaire, in the 
iconic last lines of his great poem ‘Le Voyage’: 
Nous voulons, tant ce feu nous brûle le cerveau, 
Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu’importe? 
Au fond de l’Inconnu pour trouver du nouveau! 
[We wish, the fire so burns in our brain, 
To dive deep into the abyss, Hell or Heaven, who cares? 
Into the depths of the Unknown to find something new!]111 
Notes 
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to theorize only a few years later in The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay 
in the Philosophy of Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). But I also recall 
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draw on alternative ventures like John Rockwell’s All American Music: Composition in 
the Late Twentieth Century (New York: Knopf, 1983), whose call for catholicity of taste 
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Variations: ‘where Adorno does indulge in long passages of technical musical discussion 
[, . . .] his criticism tends to be uninspired’ (49). 
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31 Stefan Jarocinski, Debussy: Impressionism and Symbolism, trans. Rollo Myers (London: 
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Dahlhaus. In fact, both Cézanne and Mallarmé were of the same generation as leading 
Impressionists Claude Monet and Alfred Sisley (all born ca. 1840); Debussy referred, at a 
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33 PNM, 63. 
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OHWM, vol. 4, 141. 
57 OHWM, vol. 4, 686. 
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61 Dahlhaus, Foundations, 141–42. 
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